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Abstract
We present a novel proof-of-concept attack named
Trojan of Things (ToT), which aims to attack NFC-
enabled mobile devices such as smartphones. The
key idea of ToT attacks is to covertly embed mali-
ciously programmed NFC tags into common objects
routinely encountered in daily life such as banknotes,
clothing, or furniture, which are not considered as
NFC touchpoints. To fully explore the threat of ToT,
we develop two striking techniques named ToT de-
vice and Phantom touch generator. These techniques
enable an attacker to carry out various severe and so-
phisticated attacks unbeknownst to the device owner
who unintentionally puts the device close to a ToT.
We discuss the feasibility of the attack as well as the
possible countermeasures against the threats of ToT
attacks.
1 Introduction
Today, we use a smartphone not only for accessing
to the various Internet services, but also for interact-
ing with the networked devices around us, e.g., wire-
less headphones, fitness devices, smart home devices,
connected cars, and contactless payment systems. To
communicate with these networked devices, modern
smartphones are shipped with various networking in-
terfaces such as cellular networks, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth,
and NFC. This trend has made smartphones getting
more and more connected to our life – Anywhere,
Anytime and with Anything.
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Given the pervasive network connectivity of smart-
phones, we propose a new proof-of-concept attack
named Trojan of Things (ToT). ToT attacks target
the NFC-enabled mobile devices such smartphones.
The key idea of ToT attacks is to covertly embed ma-
liciously programmed NFC tags into common objects
(“things”) routinely encountered in daily life such as
banknotes, clothing, or furniture, which are not con-
sidered as NFC touchpoints. NFC tags are passive
devices that can communicate with active NFC de-
vices, e.g., NFC-equipped smartphones. An NFC tag
comprises a thin processor chip and an antenna. It is
small enough to be embedded into a business card.
The threat of maliciously programmed NFC tag
has been reported in the past [24, 23, 27, 22, 28, 9].
An attacker can leverage an NFC tag to trigger risky
actions; e.g., opening a malicious URL in a browser
without user approval [22] or forcing a smartphone
to pair with a rogue Bluetooth device [27, 22]. What
distinguishes ToT from prior work is its stealth; in-
stead of actively prompting victims to touch a point
such as a smart poster where a malicious NFC tag
was embedded, ToT passively waits for victims to ap-
proach a malicious NFC tag that is embedded within
ordinary objects so that victims will not even realize
that their devices may engage in NFC communica-
tion with these tags. That is, a ToT aims to carry
out an attack without being perceived by the victims.
To fully explore the threat of ToT attacks, we de-
velop a ToT device, which is used to mount sophis-
ticated ToT attacks. It consists of a processor, com-
munication interface such as Wi-Fi, and an NFC-tag
emulator, which is a device that makes use of the
NFC card emulation mode and can act as multiple
NFC tags. The standard operation of a ToT device
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is as follows. It first presents a malicious URL to
the victim device. The ToT device works with a web
server behind the URL. The web server fingerprints
the victim device and conveys the type of the device
to the ToT device. The ToT device uses this infor-
mation to tailor additional tags to be sensed by the
victim device.
Although malicious NFC tags can induce a victim
device to do certain low-risk actions such as opening
a URL without prompting the user, higher-risk ac-
tions such as pairing with a Bluetooth device do re-
quire user confirmation. To deal with this problem,
we develop several alternative techniques to deceive
the user into confirming the prompt. In addition,
we develop a new technique named Phantom touch
generator, which aims to deceive victim devices into
sensing phantom touch events in their touch screens
by applying strong electromagnetic field at a specific
frequency to trigger capacitive coupling. These tech-
niques enable an attacker to carry out various attacks
without being noticed by the device owner who unin-
tentionally puts the device close to the installed ToT.
We make the following contributions:
• We present a novel class of attacks that we call
ToT, which injects malicious functionalities into
common objects (Section 3).
• We develop the two effective techniques; “ToT
device” (Section 4) and “Phantom touch gener-
ator” (Section 5).
• We demonstrate the feasibility of ToT attacks
using 24 smartphones for the NFC reading ex-
periments and 7 smartphones for the Phantom
touch generator experiments (Section 6).
• We provide possible countermeasures against
the threats of ToT attacks (Section 7).
2 Background
In this section, we provide background information
on the two key technologies used in our attack, NFC
and capacitive touchscreen, which are widely used in
smartphones.
2.1 NFC
Near-Field Communication (NFC) is a short-range
wireless communication technology widely used in
many applications, e.g., contactless payment systems,
transit passes, smart posters, and smartphone apps.
According to Ref. [16], the number of smartphones
equipped with NFC is drastically increasing year by
year. Roughly two-thirds of all smartphones shipped
in 2018 are expected to be equipped with NFC.
NFC makes use of magnetic inductive coupling to
communicate between two devices. NFC devices can
be classified into two types: active and passive NFC
device. An active NFC device has its own power
source and acts as an NFC reader/writer. A passive
NFC device, e.g., NFC-equipped IC card or NFC tag,
does not have its own power source. When an active
NFC tries to read data from a passive NFC device,
it emits a weak magnetic field to induce electric cur-
rent in the passive NFC device. Given the electric
current, the passive NFC device encodes data and
generate a magnetic field to induce electric current
in the active device. While the theoretical working
distance of NFC is up to 20 cm, the practical working
distance is a maximum of about 4 cm.
NFC is a communication protocol that can ex-
change data just by bringing NFC compatible de-
vices close to each other. In many NFC applications,
communication is established without going through
user interaction; e.g., mobile payments are completed
just by placing the two devices at a close distance.
This design leads to high usability. However, the
high usability of NFC raises several security issues.
Although the NFC communication range is limited
to only a few centimeters and tags can be config-
ured to be read-only, the NFC service can be eas-
ily exploited by a simple attack replacing the ex-
isting NFC tag with a malicious NFC tag. Several
studies have reported the threats of malicious NFC
tags [24, 23, 27, 22, 28, 9]. We will summarize these
studies in Section 8. Wall of Sheep, an organiza-
tion that makes people aware of security risks, recom-
mends that people should not trust NFC tags created
by third parties and take precautions [28].
Android OS has supported NFC technology from
version 2.3. Note that Android smartphones can
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Figure 1: Touch detection mechanism of mutual capacitance touchscreen [11].
Table 1: Android OS operations that can be launched
by reading an NFC tag.
operation requests user ap-
proval
open a specified URL No
launch a specified app No
send an Intent to an NFC-enabled
app
No
launch an Instant app (new) No
send email to specified address
with specified subject and body
Yes
connect to specified Wi-Fi AP Yes
pair with specified Bluetooth de-
vice
Yes
work as either a passive or an active NFC device. In
the following, we focus on the characteristics of An-
droid smartphones as an active NFC device. When
an Android device is held over an NFC tag, Android
OS can perform various operations by reading the
data recorded in the NFC tag. Table 1 lists the oper-
ations that can be launched by reading an NFC tag.
Recently, Google announced a new technology called
Android Instant Apps [5]. It allows a user to use
apps without downloading/installing them. Android
Instant Apps can be accessed via a web link or an
NFC tag containing the web link. Thus, reading an
NFC tag can launch a new app that has not been
installed on the smartphone.
2.2 Capacitive Touchscreen
Majority of the current mobile devices such as smart-
phones and tablets are equipped with touchscreens.
While there are various technologies for sensing
touch, mutual capacitive sensors are widely used for
smartphones as they have high durability, fast re-
sponse, and multitouch support [6].
As shown in Figure 1, a mutual capacitance touch-
screen controller consists of transmitter (TX) elec-
trodes and receiver (RX) electrodes, which are mu-
tually coupled, e.g., C0 in the figure. The grid of TX
and RX electrodes is used for sensing touch events.
As the human body has a capacitance, it can act as
a capacitor. When a finger approaches to the screen
surface, it passes electric charge onto the touchscreen
sensors through mutual capacitance (Cf in the fig-
ure). Thus, the touchscreen controller can detect
touches by measuring the changes in electric current
that flows into the RX electrodes; the current changes
are caused by the changes in capacitance between the
TX and RX electrodes. The pair of TX and RX elec-
trodes for which the changes are detected is used to
locate the area of touch.
It is known that a touchscreen controller in a
smartphone can malfunction due to noise signals
leaked from the smartphone’s battery charger or
screen [18]. Touchscreen controller manufacturing
companies have developed countermeasures against
the electromagnetic interference (EMI) caused by
noise signals, which are relatively weak. However,
when a stronger noise signal is intentionally applied
to a touchscreen controller, false touch events can be
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generated. As some hobbyists have reported [25, 7], it
is known that false touch events occur when a smart-
phone is brought close to a commercial plasma ball,
which is powered by an oscillator and a high-voltage
transformer circuit producing a large alternating
voltage, typically 25 kV at around 30 kHz [3, 26]. The
strong electric field generated by the electric circuit
of the plasma ball causes capacitive coupling with the
touchscreen sensors; the coupling causes changes in
electric current flowing into the RX electrodes and
the changes are detected as random touch events.
3 Trojan of Things
In this section, we present the overview of ToT at-
tacks. We first describe our threat model. We then
introduce several attacks using malicious NFC tags.
Finally, we present examples of ToT implementations
and their implications.
3.1 Threat model
In this work, we assume an attacker has embedded
a malicious NFC device into a targeted thing in ad-
vance. If the target is a small and portable thing such
as banknote or clothing, the attacker embeds a ma-
licious NFC tag into it. This device can carry out a
simple attack. If the target is a large and stationary
thing such as a table, the attacker can embed sev-
eral components, e.g., an NFC-tag emulator, a single-
board computer, and high-voltage transformer, in it.
This is what we call a ToT device, which is used to
carry out sophisticated attacks.
We also assume the victim has an Android smart-
phone equipped with NFC. The victim unintention-
ally places the smartphone close to a ToT, and the
smartphone automatically reads a malicious NFC
tag/emulator when it is unlocked and not in the sleep
mode. The validity of this assumption will be dis-
cussed in Section 7. After reading the NFC Data
Exchange Format (NDEF) records stored in the ma-
licious NFC tag/emulator, the smartphone will ex-
ecute a corresponding operation used for attacks,
which will be described in the next subsection.
As triggering high risk actions such as connecting
NFC tag emulator
ToT device
simple ToT
Phantom 
touch 
generator
Attacks to touchscreenCombination attack 
Single-shot attack 
Single-board
computer
Section 4 Section 5
NFC tag
Electric 
touch
Figure 2: Overview of ToT attacks.
to Wi-Fi AP requires user approval by displaying a
dialog box with a confirmation message, we develop
two techniques to evade the user approval process.
The first is to mislead the user into approving the dia-
log box by different ways of manipulating the UI such
as showing a deceptive message or dimming relevant
parts of the display (Section 4). The second tech-
nique is an attack on the touchscreen named Phan-
tom touch generator (Section 5). Figure 2 summarize
the types of ToT, possible attacks, and the system
components.
3.2 Attacks using the malicious NFC
tags
As shown in Table 1, two types of operations can
be invoked via NFC: operations that require user ap-
proval and operations that do not. The latter re-
quire will be automatically executed if an NFC tag
is brought close to a smartphone. We call an attack
that makes use of such operations as a single-shot
attack. A representative example of a single-shot at-
tack is opening a malicious URL in a browser; such a
malicious website can trigger download/installation
of a malware on the smartphone [28].
By combining multiple single-shot attacks, we can
create more sophisticated attacks, which we call com-
bination attacks. ToT device is a system that im-
plements combination attacks. Combination attacks
enable an attacker to establish device fingerprinting.
As shown in Section 4, device fingerprinting is useful
to infer the language used for the device; the infor-
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mation can be used to display a dialog box with a
deceptive message to the victim. The fingerprint in-
formation can also be used for displaying a dialog box
with a suitable message, which needs to be adaptive
to the vendor-specific customization of confirmation
message strings.
Operations that require user approval can be used
for high risk attacks. For instance, by forcing a de-
vice to connect to a malicious Wi-Fi AP, the attacker
can establish the man-in-the-middle attack. Or, the
attacker can even take complete control of the smart-
phone by forcing the device to pair with a Bluetooth
mouse, which can be used as a remote control. Thus,
evading the user approval process is a key success fac-
tor of the attacks. One way to evade the use approval
process is to display a dialog box with a deceptive
message, as we discussed above. Actual examples of
composing such a deceptive message will be described
in Section 4. Another way is to employ the new at-
tack we developed, Phantom touch generator, which
will be described in Section 5.
3.3 Examples of ToT implementation
In order to let a victim accidentally scan a malicious
NFC tag/emulator on his/her smartphone, a mali-
cious NFC tag/emulator should be embedded in a
thing that has many opportunities to come close to a
smartphone. In this section, we present two examples
of a simple ToT and an example of a ToT device.
Figure 3 presents an implementation of a simple
ToT in a banknote. We embedded a malicious NFC
tag into a toy banknote imitating a one dollar bill.
The NFC tag is embedded into an area indicated by
a circle, as shown in the figure. We placed the bill
in a wallet and the wallet in the pocket. When an
unlocked smartphone was placed in the pocket, the
smartphone read the data from the malicious NFC
tag. Thus, the ToT attack is easy to deploy and
feasible. The implications of such a ToT attack are
as follows. The most notable feature of banknote is
that it physically circulates from person to person.
Therefore, by embedding a malicious NFC tag in a
banknote, several smartphones can be attacked one
after another. In addition, since many people may
carry their wallet and smartphone together in their
Figure 3: ToT as a
banknote.
Figure 4: ToT as a pair
of trousers.
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Figure 5: ToT device as a desk.
pockets or bags, there are many opportunities for the
ToT to attack an individual smartphone. We also
note that it is not easy to track the attacker once a
mobile ToT is disseminated into the real world.
Figure 4 presents an implementation of an another
simple ToT in a pair of trousers. A malicious NFC
tag is embedded into an area surrounded by a circle
shown in the figure, i.e., on the back of the pocket.
Since clothes may be washed in a washing machine,
sewing a durable (e.g., laminated) NFC tag is suit-
able for this attack. When an unlocked smartphone
was placed into a pocket with a malicious NFC tag,
the smartphone successfully read the data from the
malicious NFC tag. The implications of such a ToT
attack are as follows. The target can be extended to
various clothing items such as clothes displayed at a
clothing retailer, rental clothes, laundary being dried
outdoors, or a suit hanging on a chair. Since clothing
is personal, it can also be used for a targeted attack.
By embedding a malicious NFC tag in a part which
has a high possibility of being close to a smartphone,
such as a chest pocket, a trouser pocket, or the end
of a sleeve, we can increase the opportunities for a
smartphone to read the malicious NFC tag.
Finally, Figure 5 presents an implementation of
ToT device using a desk. In this implementation, an
NFC emulator, a single-board computer, and other
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Figure 6: Overview of ToT device.
devices needed for Phantom touch generat are em-
bedded under the table top of the desk. We will eval-
uate how the thickness of the table top of the desk
affects the NFC reading in Section 6. The ToT de-
vice will be installed at a fixed location such as in
a library. If the attacker places the ToT device at
a public space, a large number of person will come
close to it.
4 ToT Device
In this section, we first provide an overview of ToT
device. We then present combination attacks, which
can be established using the ToT device.
4.1 Overview
Figure 6 presents an overview of the ToT device. It
comprises the two primary components, an NFC tag
emulator and a single-board computer with a Wi-Fi
controller installed. The ToT device works with a
web server, which can be set anywhere connected to
the Internet, e.g., a cloud server. We note that the
attacker also needs to install a power source. As an
NFC-tag emulator, we used Sony RC-S380 for our
experiments. By using the NFC-tag emulator, we
can dynamically switch the NFC tags according to
the attack scenario.
We now describe how the ToT device works using
the example shown in the figure.
1© First, the NFC tag emulator acts as an NFC tag
with a URL data recorded and waits for a victim to
approach.
2© When the victim’s smartphone comes close to the
ToT, it reads the tag and launches a browser to open
the URL.
3© The browser then connects to the website speci-
fied by the recorded URL.
4© The website employs device fingerprinting by us-
ing JavaScript to collect information about the vic-
tim’s device.
5© The website sends the device fingerprinting infor-
mation to the computer onboard the ToT device.
We assume that the computer has Internet access.
6© Upon receiving the device information, the com-
puter determines the tag suited for the victim’s de-
vice and rewrites the NDEF record of the NFC tag
emulator.
7© Finally, the victim’s smartphone reads the new
NDEF record from the tag and gets attacked again.
Note that the smartphone will read a new record
after the emulator is turned off (which implies that
the old tag went away) and turned on again.
4.2 Combination attacks
As we have shown, the framework of software-defined
malicious NFC tags enables an attacker to employ the
device fingerprinting. By using the device fingerprint-
ing information, the attacker can further perform a
targeted attack, which leverages the intrinsic features
of the mobile devices, e.g., language setting, vendor
customization, and the noise tolerance characteristics
of the touchscreen controllers, etc. In the following,
we present the two applications of the combination
attacks – deceptive message trap and exploiting in-
stalled apps. Both attacks aim to deceive a victim
into touching a button, which establishes the attack,
e.g., connecting to a malicious Wi-Fi AP that em-
ploys the man-in-the-middle attack.
4.2.1 Deceptive message trap
To make the descriptions easy to follow, we first de-
scribe a case where the attacker does not use the de-
vice fingerprinting. We then describe a case where
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the attacker needs device fingerprinting.
The deceptive message trap is an attack that aims
to deceive a victim into touching a button that es-
tablishes the attack. We focus on the scenario of a
Wi-Fi attack as a representative example. In this sce-
nario, the goal of the attacker is to deceive a victim in
touching the “CONNECT” button when a modified
message pops up after reading the malicious NFC tag
with the WiFiConfig record.
In the Android OS, as of February 2017,
the format of the confirmation message invoked
by the WiFiConfig NFC record is defined in
the file named, android/platform/packages/apps/
Nfc/res/values/strings.xml [10]. Figure 7 sum-
marizes an excerpt of the main part. Here, the
strings shaded with gray are replaced with the ser-
vice set identifier (SSID) value specified in the WiFi-
Config NFC record. SSID is an identifier for a Wi-Fi
AP. Since the maximum length of the strings used
for specifying a SSID is set to 32 bytes and the
SSID encoding scheme allows the use of the UTF-8
charset [15], the attacker can tweak the SSID strings
to deceive a victim.
We show an attack scenario using this trick. The
attacker creates a malicious NFC tag with the SSID
of WiFiConfig record set to “again”. When the vic-
tim’s smartphone approaches to the ToT device with
the malicious NFC, the following confirmation mes-
sage pops on the screen: Connect to network again?
When the victim notices this message popping up,
she/he may think that the Internet connection is lost
and the smartphone is asking to reconnect to the
previously connected network, and will touch “CON-
NECT”. Thus, the man-in-the-middle attack is es-
tablished. Note that a single-board computer can
work as a malicious Wi-FI AP. Along this line, the
attacker can create various deceptive messages such
as Connect to network to prevent the data lost?
Such a message will threaten the victim into touching
the “CONNECT” button, which again will connect
the smartphone to the malicious Wi-Fi AP.
We now turn our attention to the case where the
attacker needs device fingerprinting. As the format
shown in Figure 7 represents the case for uncus-
tomized Android with the language configured to En-
glish, the attacker may want to customize the mes-
sage according to the language used by the victim and
the model of the smartphone. Through the analysis
of 24 Android smartphones equipped with NFC, we
found that several vendor customizations use differ-
ent formats for the confirmation messages. For ref-
erence, we summarize the result in Table 3, 4, and 5
(Appendix). To cope with such differences, the at-
tacker can use the information obtained from device
fingerprinting, which was presented in Section 4.2.
4.2.2 Exploiting Installed Apps
This attack leverages the apps installed in the vic-
tim’s smartphone. For this attack, the attacker spec-
ifies “Android Application“ in the NDEF record of
a malicious tag. After reading the application tag,
Android OS will automatically execute the applica-
tion specified in the record without requiring user ap-
proval. There are two variations of this attack. The
first variation aims to make the deceiving message
look real by intentionally creating a context. The at-
tacker first sets an Application NFC tag that launches
a popular SNS app such as Facebook. Subsequently,
the Facebook app appears on the screen of the vic-
tim’s smartphone. The attacker then sets the WiFi-
Config NFC tag using the technique described in the
previous subsection. The message popping on the
screen appears as follows: Connect to network ? Facebook app is requesting.
Since the dialog box of this message appears on top
of the Facebook app, it looks as if the message is orig-
inated from the Facebook app. Some Facebook users
may touch the “CONNECT” button, never knowing
that the message is for connecting to a malicious Wi-
Fi AP. Note that to create this message, we set the
following text string as the SSID: “\u202E.gnitseuqer
si ppa koobecaF“, where ‘\u202E’ is a Unicode char-
acter known as RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE.
Another variation is to make use of a utility ap-
plication that adjusts the brightness of the screen,
e.g., “Screen Filter” [12], which has been installed by
more than 5 million users as of February 2017. Since
the aim of such applications is to reduce eye stain
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<!-- Title for dialog where user confirms that they want to connect to the network on the tag they tapped-->
<string name="title_connect_to_network">Connect to network</string>
<!-- Message prompt asking the user if they wish to connect to the given network. Contains the network name (ssid).-->
<string name="prompt_connect_to_network">Connect to network <xliff:g id="network ssid">%1$s</xliff:g> ?</string>
Figure 7: Format of the confirmation message invoked by the WiFiConfig NFC record (English).
while using the smartphone during nighttime, the
users usually adjust the brightness level lower than
the default setting. Therefore, when the app is exe-
cuted, the screen gets darker, which makes the char-
acters displayed on the screen difficult to read during
daytime. The attacker first sets an application tag
that executes such an app. If the victim’s smartphone
comes close to the tag, the screen automatically be-
comes darker. The attacker then switches the tag to
the Wi-Fi tag mode. A pop-up message that is dif-
ficult to read during daytime automatically appears
on the dark screen. The users may accidentally click
the “CONNECT” button in such a situation.
We provide screenshots of the attacks described
above in the appendix.
5 Attacks to Touchscreen
In this section, we will first describe the new attack,
named Phantom touch generator, which aims to al-
ter the selection of a button on a screen; i.e., while a
victim thought that she/he touched the button “A”,
the attack can scatter the recognized touched posi-
tion and make the operating system recognize an-
other button “B” touched. We then present another
attack to the touchscreen; an attacker installs a cir-
cuit board on top of the table/desk, which can di-
rectly cause touch events at an arbitrary position.
5.1 Phantom touch generator
5.1.1 Overview
Phantom touch generator is an attack that aims to
scatter touch events around the original touch area;
i.e., even though a victim touches a “CANCEL” but-
ton, which should cancel the request to connect to
a malicious Wi-Fi AP, the attack make the operat-
ing system recognize the event as a touch of another
button, “CONNECT,” in a probablistic way. Thus,
the attack can trick the user, with a certain success
rate. In the following section, we aim to present the
basic mechanism of Phantom touch generator and re-
veal the conditions that are needed to establish the
attack.
The key idea of Phantom touch generator is to
intentionally cause the malfunction by injecting in-
tentional noise signals from the external. As we dis-
cussed in Section 2, a touchscreen controller mounted
on a smartphone can cause a malfunction due to the
noise signals [18]. The malfunctions include three
types: (1) “false touch,” which reports touches at
positions where no touch is present, (2) “no-touch,”
which reports that a touch does not exist when a fin-
ger touches the area, and (3) “jitter,” which reports
the coordinates distributed around the true touch
point [18].
As we had hints from the experiments of toy
plasma balls [26], we found that we can intention-
ally cause the malfunction by generating an electric
field near the capacitive touchscreen controller, using
an electric circuit that can produce large alternating
voltage. Applying such signals using a metal plate
can create a capacitive coupling with the capacitive
sensors of touchscreen controllers. As we showed in
Section 2, the capacitive coupling causes the changes
of capacitance between the TX and RX electrodes of
the touchscreen controller, and the changes will be
detected as the (false) touch events.
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5.1.2 Experiments
To study the conditions that can cause the “false
touches,” we conduct several experiments using the
touchscreen controller that provides raw data col-
lected from the capacitive sensors. In the following,
we first describe our experimental setup. Second, we
attempt to specify the intrinsic frequency of injected
noise signal to maximize the false touches. We then
analyze the spatial patterns of the false touch events
on the screen with a noise injected at a specific fre-
quency. Finally, we study how an actual touch event
by a user affects the spatial patterns of the false touch
events. This final experiment will reveal the mecha-
nism of Phantom touch generator.
Experimental setup Figure 8 shows our experi-
mental setup. Our objective is to measure the ef-
fect of noise signals on the behavior of touchscreens.
For this experiment, we use the Raspberry Pi 7-inch
Touchscreen Display. As an intentional noise signal,
we use the sine-wave signal generated by a function
generator. We set a copper sheet parallel to the
touchscreen controller. This copper sheet is used to
create a capacitive coupling with the capacitive sen-
sors. The distance between the sheet and controller
was set to 7 cm. We note that the attack can be ap-
plied from the rear side of a touchscreen controller,
i.e., the rear side of a smartphone.
Effect of the frequencies and voltage values
We generate sine-wave noise signals with different
frequencies and voltage values. We record raw ca-
pacitance values and touch events using the software
we developed. Since the touchscreen has 264 capaci-
tance sensors, which consists of a 12× 22 matrix, we
can obtain 264-dimensional time-series data. This
setup enables us to analyze the spatial patterns of
the generated touch events.
To measure the interference intensity on the touch-
screen, we introduce a metric, ∆, defined as follows.
δi = xi − x¯i
∆ = max
i
(δi)−min
i
(δi),
where xi (i ∈ {1, . . . , 264}) is a measured value for
Function GeneratorAmplifier
Touchscreen
with Raspberry Pi 
Copper Sheet
Copper Sheet
Touchscreen with Raspberry Pi Amplifier (HSA 4012)
Function Generator
(SIGLENT SDG1025)
Figure 8: Experimental setup.
each sensor and x¯i (i ∈ {1, . . . , 264}) is a measured
value for each sensor when noise is not injected, re-
spectively. We note that xi is variable of time; our
capacitance logger sampled the raw values at the rate
of 7 times per second. In contrast, x¯i was set as a
static value, which was collected when no signal was
injected. If no noise signal is applied, ∆ becomes
roughly 20 when there are no touch events on the
screen and ∆ becomes greater than 250 when a finger
touches the screen. Thus, the metric ∆ can measure
the impact of noise interference.
We measured ∆, applying noise signal to the cop-
per sheet with three different voltages (20 Vpp,
70Vpp, and 120Vpp) and frequencies, ranging from 5
kHz to 300 kHz. Figure 9 shows the results. We first
notice that there are clear peaks at the frequency of
90 kHz. This result indicates that there is a charac-
teristic frequency of noise that can affect the touch
controller. As we will study in the next section, this
frequency differs for different models of touchscreen
controllers. So, specifying the model of the target
is crucial to succeeding in the attack. As we have
seen, the device fingerprinting technique can be used
9
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Figure 9: The effect of different frequencies on touch-
screen.
for this purpose. We also notice that the effect of
noise becomes larger with higher voltage in the sig-
nals. As we shall show in the next section, we need
to apply higher voltage to succeed in attacks to the
smartphones.
Spatial distribution of the false touch events
We now study the positions of the touch events
caused by the noise signals. In this experiment, noth-
ing touches the screen. Using our monitoring soft-
ware, we record touch positions for 30 seconds with
the sampling rate of two samples per second. The
touchscreen has an 800×480 resolution and supports
a 10-point multi-touch. The touchscreen controller
is capable of reporting up to 10 positions per sam-
ple. Note that the touch events are collected from
the outputs of the touchscreen controller, not from
an operating system.
We used three different voltages (20 Vpp, 70 Vpp,
and 120 Vpp) and the following two representative
frequencies: 60 kHz as a frequency not affecting ∆
and 90 kHz as a frequency affecting ∆ the most. As
expected, the touchscreen does not report any touch
events with the 60 kHz frequency. In the followings,
we omit the results of 60 kHz frequency. Figure 10
shows the results for 90 kHz frequency. First, we no-
tice that the touchscreen controller did not recognize
touch events when the voltage was set to 20 Vpp.
We also see that higher voltage signals cause false
touch events more frequently. Second, we see intrin-
sic spatial patterns of touch events, i.e., they linearly
spread out on the screen1. We also see that many
touch events are focused on the top or bottom edges
of the screen panel. These observations indicate that
even if an attacker waits for a long time, it seems un-
likely that a false touch is fired at target coordinates
with a high probability, given the skewed spatial dis-
tribution.
Limiting the dispersion with a real touch event
After several trials, we found that touching on a
screen can fix the skewed spatial distribution of false
touches. Although not conclusive due to the “black
box” nature of the touchscreen controllers, we conjec-
ture that the touching with a finger stabilizes the area
of capacitive coupling. The good feature of this phe-
nomenon is that while touching on a screen makes the
distribution focused on a certain area, it still keeps
scattering the touch events; thus, it can create false
touch events in a more predictable way.
We repeated the similar experiments but added a
finger touch this time. Figure 11 shows the experi-
ment results. Under the low voltage signal of 20 Vpp,
the false touch events occur only if a finger touches
the screen. More importantly, we can see that the
positions of the false touches are centered on the line
where the true touch point is located. These are de-
sirable characteristics because usually, GUI buttons
are aligned in a row; e.g., CONNECT/CANCEL,
YES/NO, or OK/CANCEL. Therefore, an attacker
can expect that a touch event will be scattered on
a wrong button, with a probability of 1/2, with an
assumption that the touch events are uniformly scat-
tered along a line. We note that screen orientation
also matters. If a screen is in portrait mode, scat-
tered touch events along the vertical line may not
produce a touch on the targeted button. As we show
in Section 6, the direction of scattered touch events
1As we will see in the next section, the direction of the
spread patterns differs for different models of touchscreen con-
trollers; i.e., horizontal spread or vertical spread.
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Figure 10: Coordinates of the touch points reported by the touchscreen controller. The injected signals had
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Figure 11: Coordinates of the touch points reported by the touchscreen controller. While the experiment a
finger keeps touching the point centered on the screen. Left: no signal is applied. Right: a signal with 20
Vpp and 90 kHz is applied.
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Figure 12: A circuit board that triggers the electri-
cal touches. Top: a plate electrode on the circuit
board (left) and the circuit board masked with a
woodgrained paper (right). Bottom: A touch oc-
curs when the plate electrode is connected to the
green code, which has a large capacitance (left). A
touch does not occur when the plate electrode is dis-
connected from anything (right). A simple relay can
switch the two states: connected and disconnected.
differ among the different models. By making use
of the device fingerprinting techniques, an attacker
can obtain the information about the model as well
as the current screen orientation; these information
will be used to check whether or not Phantom touch
generator is effective.
5.2 Electrical touch
So far, we have assumed that the NFC controller is
mounted on the rear side of the smartphone, and
Phantom touch generator attacks the touchscreen
from the rear side. However, there are several smart-
phones/tablets that mount the NFC controller on the
front side of the devices; e.g., Nexus 10, Xperia XZ,
and ZenFone 3 Deluxe. These mobile devices read
NFC tags on the same side with its touchscreen.
For this type of devices, an attacker can trigger
arbitrary touch events by directly touching the screen
when a victim puts the device on a table-type ToT
with the touchscreen down. An attacker installs a
simple circuit with plate electrodes on the surface of
ToT – embedding the circuit in the table top. We
implemented such a circuit as shown in Figure 12.
The circuit works as follows. The plate electrodes
on the circuit capacitively couple with the TX elec-
trodes of the touchscreen when the circuit gets close
enough to the touchscreen. The capacitance between
one of the electrodes on the circuit and TX electrodes
becomes low when the circuit electrodes are discon-
nected from anywhere and becomes high when the
circuit electrodes are grounded or connected to an
object that has large electric capacitance. By sys-
temizing this mechanism, an attacker can virtually
touch an arbitrary position by relaying a correspond-
ing electrode to the ground or the object with a large
capacitance.
The circuit shown in Figure 12 has a 1-cm2 of
square plate electrode. If we implement several plate
electrodes that are placed 0.5 cm away from each
other, the resolution of touch becomes 1.5 cm. The
area of plate electrode of the circuit is proportional to
the capacitance between the electrode of the circuit
and touchscreen. Therefore, plate electrodes that are
too small cannot create enough change of capacitance
by grounding it. However, an attacker could obtain
finer resolution by using circuits used for active sty-
luses, which actively interrupt field coupling between
the electrodes of the touchscreen.
An attacker can make use of this attack as follows:
An attacker first employs the device fingerprinting
to know that the device has the NFC controller at
front side. Using the website, the attacker can ob-
tain the information about the device orientation us-
ing the web API interface. Using the position of the
used NFC tag and the orientation information, the
attacker can estimate the area of the touchscreen.
Finally, an attacker can pinpoint the position of the
button for establishing the attack and make the elec-
trical touch by grounding the corresponding plate
electrode.
6 Feasibility Studies
To demonstrate the feasibility of ToT devices, we per-
formed two empirical studies. The first study aims to
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verify that NFC tags embedded inside a thing can be
actually read by smartphones. For this study, we use
24 Android smartphones/tablets, which are manufac-
tured by the 12 different vendors. We summarize the
list of devices we used in Table 3 (Appendix). The
second study aims to verify the success of Phantom
touch generator attack. For this study, we use 7 An-
droid smartphones/tablets listed in Table 2 2.
6.1 Maximum NFC Reading Distance
We study the maximum NFC reading distance of the
smartphones to demonstrate the validity of the idea
of embedding malicious NFC tags in a thing. A NFC
tag is attached to the backside of the wood board
of the walnut material. We read the tag using the
smartphones placed on the backside. We measured
the maximum communicable distance by changing
the thickness of the wood board at intervals of 5 mm
and recording the success of reading the tag. We
found that the maximum NFC reading distance was
3.4 cm in average. The maximum and minimum of
the measured distance were 5.0 cm and 2.0 cm, re-
spectively. The full result is summarized in Table 3
(Appendix). If we consider the thickness of common
objects such as a table top or a wallet, we can con-
clude that the measured maximum distance is large
enough to establish the attacks by ToT.
6.2 Conditions of the successful Phan-
tom touch generator attacks.
Using the smartphones that have the NFC controller
on the frontside, we empirically study the conditions
for the successful attacks. Unlike the experiment us-
ing a Raspberry Pi 7-inch touchscreen display, we
need higher voltage to establish Phantom touch gen-
erator attack. As our amplifier is not capable of gen-
erating voltage greater than 150 Vpp, we used a high-
voltage transformer taken out of a plasma ball, which
costs about 6 USD.
Figure 13 shows the setup of the experiments. The
smartphone and the copper sheet are insulated with
2We rented 17 devices for the first study and were not able
to used these devices for the second study because applying the
attack has a risk of causing physical damages on the devices.
Function GeneratorAmplifier
Copper Sheet
Copper Sheet
Smartphone
High-Voltage
Transformer
High-Voltage 
Probe
Oscilloscope
Smartphone
High-Voltage
Transformer
Smartphone
Copper Sheet
Polycarbonate Sheet
(5 mm Thick)
Figure 13: Block diagram and photos of setup for
observing effect of alternating current on off-the-shelf
smartphones
the polycarbonate plate of 5 mm thick. Following the
procedure that is shown in Section 5.1, we first iden-
tify the characteristic frequencies for the smartphones
to cause the malfunctions. For the smartphones that
had caused malfunctions, we will further test the fol-
lowing tasks. We will create a NFC tag that requests
the Bluetooth paring. The smartphone will pop up a
dialog message after reading the tag. We then touch
the button of “NO.” Before the smartphone reads
the tag, we have applied Phantom touch generator.
We will see whether the actual touch becomes “YES”
(attack succeeded) or “NO” (attack failed).
Sometimes, we do not see any responses even
though we touch the button due to the noise injec-
tion. In such cases, if there are no responses back
after the five consecutive touches, we count it as a
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failure of the attack. Also, if the patterns of the
touch scattering for a device has a horizontal/ver-
tical direction, we set the orientation of the device to
portrait/landscape.
Table 2 summarizes the results. For the 5 out of
7 models, we specified the characteristic frequencies
and voltage values that can cause malfunction, i.e.,
“false touch.” Of the 5 models that cause malfunc-
tions, 3 models succeeded the attack with probabili-
ties distributed around 1/2; i.e., the OS detected the
touch for a wrong button and the device was paired
with a Bluetooth device. The rest of 2 models worked
as follows. For Nexus 9, the detected touch events
were biased to a specific area, which was not close
to the buttons; thus, the attacks failed. For AQUOS
ZETA SH-04F, when a finger touched somewhere in
the right/left half of the screen, the false touches ap-
peared on the left/right half on the screen; thus, the
attacks failed. Thus, the patterns of false touches
depend on the models.
There were two models that did not generate false
touch events; the one that the detected touch events
lag behind the finger’s touch (Galaxy S 6 edge) and
the one that does not recognize the touch at all
(ARROWS NX F-05F). In addition the malfunctions
mentioned in Section 5.1, we found the following mal-
function patterns: Even when the noise injection is
stopped, the device stops reacting to the touch until
it goes to sleep mode, the monitoring application is
abnormally killed, and the operating system restarts,
etc.
7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the feasibility of ToT at-
tacks and possible defenses against them.
7.1 Feasibility
Our threat model makes three assumptions about a
victim’s smartphone: (1) It is an Android smart-
phone equipped with NFC, (2) the NFC functionality
is enabled on the smartphone, and (3) the screen of
the smartphone is unlocked when the smartphone is
brought close to a ToT. We now discuss the feasibility
of ToT attacks in light of these three assumptions.
The first assumption limits the scope of target de-
vices. In fact, although iOS supports NFC technol-
ogy, it has not supported reading NFC tags as of
February 2017. Still, we conjecture that the threat of
ToT attacks is potentially pervasive in future because
of the following two reasons. First, it has been fore-
casted that the shipments of Android NFC-enabled
smartphones will reach 844 million in 2018 [16], in-
dicating that the potential target of ToT attacks is
increasingly becoming ubiquitous. In addition, there
is a possibility that Android Instant Apps [5] acceler-
ates the adoption of NFC. We note, however, that the
naive use of the new technology has potential security
risks such as launching a fake browser, etc. Second,
many financial technology companies have recently
launched mobile payment services using NFC tech-
nology; this trend will continue to grow and push the
adoption of NFC-empowered smartphone services.
The second assumption limits the opportunities of
successful attacks; i.e., the attack will not succeed
unless the NFC functionality is enabled on the vic-
tim’s smartphone. To verify the second assumption,
we manually investigated 24 smartphones listed in
Table 3 (Appendix). We found that the NFC func-
tionality is enabled in the factory setting in 16 out of
24 models. Interestingly, in more recent models, the
NFC functionality is enabled in the factory setting.
The results of our survey are summarized in the ap-
pendix (see Table 3). As we already have discussed
before, we also conjecture that the number of users
who enjoy NFC services on their smartphone (thus,
will enable NFC) will keep on increasing.
Finally, the third assumption also limits the op-
portunities of successful attacks; i.e., even if a smart-
phone approaches a ToT, the attack will fail if the
smartphone’s screen is locked: Android OS will not
invoke functionalities recorded in the NDEF record
when the screen is locked. To verify the attack fea-
sibility, we analyzed two types of ToT, a simple ToT
and ToT device. Since a simple ToT can be dissemi-
nated as a small thing with an NFC tag attached, the
attacker can easily produce a large number of ToTs
with a reasonable cost. Thus, a simple ToT has high
affinity with mass attack; producing more ToTs will
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Table 2: Results of the Touch scatterer attack. The direction of the scattering patterns is defined when a
screen is set in portrait mode.
Device Manufacture Success
false
touches
Frequency
[kHz]
Voltage
[Vpp]
Success
attack
rates
Scattering
patterns
Nexus 7 ASUS X 128.2 40.0 18/30 vertical
ARROWS NX F-05F FUJITSU — — — —
Nexus 9 HTC X 280.9 490.0 0/10 horizontal
Galaxy S6 edge SAMSUNG — — — —
Galaxy S4 SAMSUNG X 384.5 70.4 13/30 horizontal
AQUOS ZETA SH-04F SHARP X 202.0 700.0 0/10 horizontal
Xperia Z4 SONY X 218.0 340.0 20/30 horizontal
increase the expected number of successes even if the
probability of each attack is small.
In contrast, it will not be easy for an attacker to in-
stall ToT device in many places due to the cost issues.
The key success factor of ToT devices is attributed
to the patterns of human behavior. Many people use
smartphones while eating food or drinking coffee. If
the attacker installs a table-type ToT device in an
eatery or a coffeehouse, the probability of the ToT
device encountering a smartphone placed on the ta-
ble with the screen unlocked is high. There are other
situations when a person places a smartphone on a
desk or a table without locking the screen. If such
a table is installed at a public space such as library,
many people will use the table in a day. Of these,
there will be several who own NFC-enabled Android
phones and place it on the table without unlocking
the screen, i.e., the expectation value of the number
of successful attacks becomes high. The malicious ta-
ble will keep waiting for new victims as long as power
is supplied. In our future work, we plan to conduct
field studies to quantify the correlation between hu-
man behavior patterns and the success of an attack.
7.2 Countermeasures
We now discuss possible countermeasures against the
threat of ToT attacks. We divide the discussion into
three groups according to three points of view.
mobile OS: The simplest and the most effective
defense is to add/improve the user approval processes
before the mobile OS launches applications recorded
in a tag. For instance, by forcing to request user
approval for all NFC-driven operations shown in Ta-
ble 1, we can eliminate the threats of a simple ToT
that leverages the single-shot attack, which targets
operations that do not require approval. Even when
the attacker uses a ToT device, showing a proper mes-
sage will decrease the chances of attack success. To
this end, mobile OS vendors should change the for-
mat of messages associated with NDEF records. By
explicitly presenting the reason why an operation is
invoked, it is possible to create a message format that
makes it impossible to generate deceptive messages.
Making the user approval process more rigorous
could sacrifice the usability of NFC-powered services.
To solve this problem, we can leverage the con-
text of NFC touch events. This has been explored
by Czeskis et al. [4], who developed techniques to
achieve context-aware communication for RFID tags
and contact-less cards. Their key idea was to lever-
age the built-in accelerometer, which can be used
to implement activity recognition techniques to in-
fer whether or not the holder of the tag physically
moves her/his hands, e.g., tap the tag against the
reader. We can use a similar technique to distin-
guish legitimate touch events from the false events
generated by a ToT. Smartphones have other sensors
that can be used to infer the context of touch events,
e.g., proximity sensor and illuminance sensor. If the
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smartphone infers that the context is likely an attack,
the level of user approval can be increased to give pri-
ority to security; otherwise, the level of user approval
is decreased to give priority to usability. Likewise, if
a smartphone infers from sensor data that it is likely
to be inside a pocket, it can automatically lock the
screen to prevent the device from reading NFC tags
unintentionally.
Smartphone hardware: While conducting the
experiments described Section 6, we noted that
some touchscreen controllers stopped working when
a strong electric field was applied. Although these
observations are not conclusive, we conjecture that
the manufactures of these controllers may have in-
stalled mechanisms to stop the controllers upon de-
tection of external noises. In fact, as Ref. [18] re-
ported, manufactures of touchscreen controllers have
developed techniques for dealing with the noise that
can interfere with capacitive touch sensing. Incorpo-
rating such mechanisms will lead to eliminating the
threats of touch scatterer. In addition, as Kune et al.
proposed in Ref. [19], there are several analog/digi-
tal countermeasures against intentional EMI attacks,
e.g., a filter that attenuates external noise signals
and signal processing to eliminate anomalous inputs.
These techniques will also be useful as countermea-
sures against the threats of Phantom touch genera-
tor. In Section 5, we also demonstrated that design
of mounting the NFC controller on the front side of
the smartphone makes generating false touch attacks
easy. To defend against the threat of such attacks,
mounting the NFC controller on the back is more
desirable.
Things: It is almost impossible to visually detect
a ToT because NFC tags are embedded into physical
things. However, there may be situations where law
enforcement agencies want to inspect tables inside a
building to investigate whether a ToT has been in-
stalled. An active probe that searches for NFC tags
should be developed to make this task easier. For this
purpose, it is also possible to build a ToT honeypot
that behaves as an NFC-enabled smartphone. The
drawback of this approach is that it is not scalable
because the practical working distance range of NFC
is at most about 4 cm. Further research is needed to
shed more light on this problem.
8 Related Work
Attacks using NFC tags: There have been several
studies on the threats of attacks using NFC tech-
nology [24, 23, 27, 22, 28, 9]. Miller [22] reported
that malicious NFC tags can attack browser exploits
and NFC stack bugs that existed at the time. Gold
et al. [9] demonstrated a phishing attack that uses
a smart poster with malicious NFC tag attached.
The accessed website prompts users to log in to a
fake SNS site. They also demonstrated that an at-
tacker can write a malicious file to the victim’s de-
vice by using the peer-to-peer mode of NFC. Wall of
Sheep [28] demonstrated the experiment using NFC
tags attached to smart posters and buttons at the
DEFCON venue. At the venue, they put posters that
say “Find a Wall of Sheep button and scan it with
your NFC phone for exclusive discounts, tools and
surprises every day.” They reported that about 50
attendees scanned the NFC tags that “could” have
been malicious tags. These studies assumed that an
attacker can come close enough to a victim, or the
victim intentionally read the malicious NFC tag by
using posters or other existing facilities. The threat
model is different from the one for ToT; an attacker
injects malicious NFC tags into common objects.
RFID tags: NFC is a specialized subset within
the family of radio frequency identification (RFID)
technology. Several researchers have studied the
risk of RFID tags that can be attached to various
things [2, 17]. Baldini et al. [2] reported the applica-
tion of RFID tags in the retail sector and discussed
associated privacy issues and countermeasures. Juels
published a survey paper on the research of privacy
and security of RFID [17]. The survey examined the
privacy protection mechanisms and integrity assur-
ance in RFID systems. In the paper, Juels mentioned
the importance of user perception of security and pri-
vacy in RFID systems as users cannot see RF emis-
sions. The indication is closely related the problem
we addressed in this paper.
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The absence of user perception in RFID systems
leads to the “relay attack,” which enables an attacker
to sets up a link between the reader and the contact-
less card without the agreement of the owner. Several
countermeasures against the relay attack on RFID
systems have been studied [14, 4, 8, 21]. As we dis-
cussed in Section 7, the techniques used as the coun-
termeasures against relay attack, such as context-
aware communication, can be useful to tackle the
threats of ToT.
Attacks on touchscreen: There have been many
studies on the side-channel attacks on touchscreens
(LCDs); Aviv et al. [1] used smudge left on the screen
to infer a graphical password, Maggi et al. [20] used
the data collected from a surveillance camera to rec-
ognize keystrokes of a victim, and Hayashi et al. [13]
used electromagnetic emanation to reconstruct a vic-
tim’s tablet display. To the best of our knowledge,
while these attacks passively steal data from the
touchscreen, our Phantom touch generator is the first
attack that actively radiates signals toward touch-
screen to cause targeted malfunctions.
9 Conclusion
We introduced a novel proof-of-concept attack named
ToT, which targets NFC-enabled smartphones. The
key concept of ToT is to inject malicious functionali-
ties into common objects, which are not considered as
NFC touchpoints. We believe that this concept sheds
new light on the security research of mobile/IoT de-
vices. To fully explore the threats of ToT attacks, we
developed two effective techniques: ToT device and
Phantom touch generator, which enable an attacker
to carry out various severe and sophisticated attacks
without being perceived by the device owner who un-
intentionally puts the device close to a ToT. Through
the extensive experiments using off-the-shelf smart-
phones, we demonstrated that the proposed attacks
work in practice. Although our attack is a proof-of-
concept, we provide possible countermeasures that
will thwart the threats. We hope that our paper will
be a catalyst to further enhance the security of NFC-
powered smartphones.
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Table 3: Results of Feasibility Studies
Device Manufacture Android
Version
Maximum
Reading
Distance
[cm]
NFC R/W
Activated
in Factory
State
Message Type
(Wi-Fi)
Message Type
(Bluetooth)
ONETOUCH IDOL 2 S ALCATEL 4.3 3.0 — BT-EN-1
Nexus 7 ASUS 6.0.1 4.0 X WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
SAMURAI KIWAMI FREETEL 5.1 3.0 WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
ARROWS NX F-05F FUJITSU 5.0.2 4.0 WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
Nexus 9 HTC 7.0 4.5 X WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
INFOBAR A02 HTC 4.1.1 2.5 — BT-EN-1
Ascend P7 HUAWEI 4.4.2 3.5 X — BT-EN-4
TORQUE G02 KYOCERA 5.1 3.5 X WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
TORQUE G01 KYOCERA 4.4.2 3.5 X — BT-EN-1
Nexus 5X LG 6.0 4.5 X WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
isai vivid LG 5.1 5.0 X WI-EN-2 BT-EN-2
DM-01G LG 5.0.2 5.0 WI-EN-2 BT-EN-2
ELUGA P PANASONIC 4.2.2 2.0 — BT-EN-1
Galaxy S7 edge SAMSUNG 6.0.1 3.0 X WI-EN-1 BT-EN-5
Galaxy S6 edge SAMSUNG 6.0.1 2.0 X WI-EN-1 BT-EN-5
Galaxy S4 SAMSUNG 5.0.1 3.0 WI-EN-1 BT-EN-5
AQUOS ZETA SH-01H SHARP 5.1.1 3.5 X WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
AQUOS ZETA SH-04F SHARP 5.0.2 3.5 X WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
AQUOS SERIE SHARP 5.0.2 3.0 X WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
Xperia XZ SONY 7.0 3.0 X WI-EN-1 BT-EN-3
Xperia Z5 SONY 6.0 3.0 X WI-EN-1 BT-EN-3
Xperia Z4 SONY 6.0 4.0 X WI-EN-1 BT-EN-3
Xperia Z3 SONY 5.0.2 3.0 X WI-EN-3 BT-EN-3
Xperia Z2 SONY 5.0.2 2.5 WI-EN-3 BT-EN-3
Table 4: List of confirmation messages invoked by the WiFiConfig record
Type Title Message Positive Button Negative Button
WI-EN-1 Connect to network Connect to network <SSID>? CONNECT CANCEL
WI-EN-2 Connect Connect to <SSID>? YES NO
WI-EN-3 <SSID> Connct to this network? CONNECT CANCEL
Table 5: List of confirmation messages invoked by the BTSSP record
Type Title Message Positive
Button
Negative
Button
BT-EN-1 — Are you sure you want to pair the Bluetooth device ? YES NO
BT-EN-2 — Bluetooth pairing requested. Pair? YES NO
BT-EN-3 — Pair with [<name>]? YES NO
BT-EN-4 NFC pairing request Pair with the Bluetooth device ? Pair Cancel
BT-EN-5 — Pair the Bluetooth device ? YES NO
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Figure 14: Wi-Fi connection dialog box (normal).
Figure 15: Wi-Fi connection dialog box (attacked).
Figure 16: Wi-Fi connection dialog box (dimmed us-
ing Screen Filter app).
Figure 17: Wi-Fi connection dialog box (customized
for Xperia Z3).
Figure 18: Wi-Fi connection dialog box (attack using
Dropbox app).
Figure 19: Wi-Fi connection dialog box (attack using
Facebook app).
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